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Making a comprehensive view of the classical literature related to 
information economics, you can find that most economists have studied 
informational asymmetry using cases from insurance markets. However people 
have long been focused their research on insurers’ relative information 
disadvantage to policyholders, and have focused too much on the influence of 
asymmetric information on the transaction behavior of policyholders, thus 
inevitably tend to exaggerate the problems brought by the information 
advantage owned by policyholders, especially the influence of adverse selection 
on insurance market equilibrium. 
Based on a dynamic examination of the asymmetric information in 
insurance markets, this dissertation conducts a series of research on how 
asymmetric information influences the behavior of insurance transaction parties 
relied on asymmetric information theory and behavioral economics theory. This 
dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 gives a brief description of the 
concepts related to information and the main ideas of the existing theories of 
informational economics and behavioral economics. Chapter 2 examines the 
asymmetric information in insurance markets from a dynamic evolving 
perspective. Chapter 3 analyses how information inferior to nature and 
psychology factors influence decision-making on demand for insurance based 
on abnormities of demand for insurance. Chapter 4 illustrates how asymmetric 
information influences supply of insurance citing an example of catastrophe 
insurance failure. Chapter 5 examines how asymmetric information influences 
the behavior of insurers, policyholders and insurance agencies in insurance 
markets of China and presents corresponding countermeasure. Chapter 6 tests 
asymmetric information problem in insurance market of China using an 
individual data set from automobile insurance market.  














asymmetric information in insurance market is bilateral and multi-ply in 
particular based on a thorough and general examination of the asymmetric 
information in insurance markets from a dynamic evolving perspective, and it 
also discusses the sources of information problems in insurance markets and 
their trends to evolve theoretically. (2) It tries to explain consumers’ 
complicated behavior of demand for insurance using behavioral economics 
theory, and points out that insurance purchase behavior of consumers is 
influenced by many phychology factors. It not only remedies the deficiency in 
traditional theory to explain the practice but also provides practical thoughts for 
insurers to design corresponding mechanism to stimulate consumers’ demand 
for insurance. (3) It explains catastrophe insurance failure from insurer’ relative 
information disadvantages to nature and then enriches the contents of insurance 
supply failure theory which is based on information. (4) It presents the concept 
of insurance lemon market and points out that attending insurance credit 
evaluation can be used by insurers as a signal, and gives another explanation to 
insurance fraud from an insurance common tragedy perspective. (5) It tests 
asymmetric information in insurance market of China using an individual data 
set from automobile insurance market for the first time.  
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